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This paper explores whether official intervention signaling effects on short-run exchange 
rate movements depend on market conditions. We find evidence that announced 
interventions significantly affect the level and reduce the volatility of the yen/dollar rate 
when traders’ expectations of future exchange rates are relatively heterogeneous. To 
compensate for the lack of daily exchange rate expectation survey data, we use implied 
volatility as a proxy since these are highly correlated. These results are consistent with 
predictions from the market microstructure models with asymmetric information across 
agents and the signaling hypothesis of foreign exchange interventions. Our findings 
indicate that the efficacy of intervention hinges not only on the firmness of signals but 
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1.  Introduction 
The Bank of Japan (BOJ hereafter) intervened in the foreign exchange markets 
during the 1990s more actively than the U.S. Federal Reserve and the German 
Bundesbank. The total volume of BOJ interventions exceeded those by the Fed and the 
Bundesbank by more than a factor of 13 (Dominguez, 2003a). Although policy makers 
seem to view sterilized interventions as an additional policy tool beyond the usual mix of 
fiscal and monetary policy, the existing literature has failed to find a reliable connection 
between official transactions in foreign exchange markets and associated exchange rate 
movements. Using recently released Japanese intervention data, Ito (2003) shows that 
Japanese interventions produced the intended effects on the yen during the second half of 
the 1990s, but were not effective in the first half of the decade.   
Overall, the empirical evidence on the effect of sterilized interventions on the 
level of exchange rates is rather mixed, attributable in part to different methodologies, 
different foreign exchange markets, different time-periods and different definitions of 
intervention success. Many researchers also consider the second moment of the exchange 
rate process and find that interventions typically increase exchange rate volatility. They 
often interpret such findings as evidence of a perverse or destabilizing effect of 
interventions. 
Recent studies reconcile these seemingly contradictory findings by suggesting 
that central banks may at times possess private information about future fundamentals 
and target values of foreign currencies. Accordingly, interventions might reveal such 
information and, depending on prevailing market sentiments, influence market 
expectations and affect exchange rates (Baillie, Humpage and Osterberg, 2000). This 
“information signaling channel” (Fatum and Hutchison, 2002) can be seen as nesting the 
“classical signaling channel”, through which interventions function as a signal of future 
monetary policy. This broad signaling channel can explain the increase in volatility 
following interventions as well, since volatility may be associated with transmission of 
information. Higher volatility is not necessarily incompatible with interventions having 
the desired effect on the level of the exchange rate (Humpage, 2003).
1 
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The current paper contributes to this strand of literature by exploring the market 
conditions under which intervention signals are likely to influence exchange rates.
 
Specifically, we test the hypothesis that announced interventions can affect the level and 
reduce the volatility of exchange rates when traders’ expectations of future exchange 
rates are heterogeneous. This holds if information asymmetry across traders leads to 
excess volatility and short-run deviations from the fundamental values of exchange rates. 
In addition, if an intervention signals unambiguous information about future market 
fundamentals, it can coordinate traders with asymmetric information and hence move the 
market rate back towards its fundamental value. We show that not only central bank 
signals but also heterogeneity in traders’ expectations due to information asymmetry 
plays a key role in the literature’s lack of robust evidence on the efficacy of intervention. 
The empirical tests are conducted using Japanese and U.S. intervention data and 
the daily yen/dollar exchange rate. We also make use of news reports by Reuters and 
Bloomberg to distinguish among ‘announced’, ‘unannounced but reported’ and 
‘completely secret’ interventions. The Japanese intervention strategy has not been 
consistent in terms of volume and frequency. As a matter of fact, Japan’s intervention 
policy has changed frequently in accordance with who is in charge of foreign exchange 
interventions at the Ministry of Finance (MOF hereafter). These features of the Japanese 
interventions enable us to investigate the effect of intervention policy on exchange rates. 
The results reveal that, even though we control for the volume effect, official 
announcements regarding interventions significantly affect the movements of exchange 
rates, supporting the signaling hypothesis. However, when this is divided into distinct 
phases, we find that announcements were quite effective only for the sub-sample period 
when former Vice Minister of Finance for International Affairs Eisuke Sakakibara, 
nicknamed “Mr. Yen” by the NY Times (Sep 16, 1995), was in charge. We then examine 
whether the effect of central bank signals is associated with market conditions. Indeed, 
                                                                                                                                                              
which sterilized interventions can affect exchange rates. The former comes from the fact that the 
sterilized interventions change the composition of portfolios and thus the risk premium. There is a 
consensus, however, that this effect is empirically weak because intervention transactions are 
miniscule relative to the stock of outstanding assets. Thus, subsequent studies have emphasized the 
signaling hypothesis. (Mussa, 1981; Dominguez and Frankel, 1990) However, Lewis (1995), 
Kaminsky and Lewis (1996) and Fatum and Hutchison (1999) find that U.S. interventions have not 
conveyed a clear signal about future monetary policy actions.   4 
 
announced interventions have a more significant influence on the level and reduce the 
volatility of exchange rates when implied volatility on the previous trading day is high. 
Given the high correlation between implied volatility and the dispersion of exchange rate 
expectations in the survey data, this suggests that the effectiveness of official 
interventions depends not only on the firmness of central bank signals but also on the 
heterogeneity of expectations among traders. 
Recent studies on foreign exchange intervention have investigated the 
significance of the signaling hypothesis using news reports and yield mixed results on the 
efficacy of reported and secret interventions to date. Dominguez (1998) suggests that 
secret interventions generally increase volatility, while reported interventions sometimes 
reduce it. By contrast, Beine, Benassy-Quere and Lecourt (2002) show that secret 
interventions have almost no impact on volatility, but reported interventions clearly 
increase the volatility of exchange rates. In this paper, we make use of recently disclosed 
data on Japanese interventions. This allows us to obtain more precise estimates than 
previous papers were able to in the absence of official Japanese intervention data. 
Some researchers have investigated whether the impact of interventions depends 
on market conditions. Using intra-daily data, Dominguez (2003a) finds that interventions 
have large effects when trading volume is high, when they are closely timed to scheduled 
macro announcements and when they are coordinated with other central banks. She does 
not, however, consider the effect of trader heterogeneity. The most closely related paper 
to ours is Beine (2003). He estimates a Markov switching model to show that after the 
Louvre Agreement, when expected volatility was relatively high, central bank 
interventions in the DEM/USD market were not necessarily destabilizing. We take a 
different approach and estimate the effects of interventions on both the level and 
volatility of exchange rates. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
theoretical background of our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the intervention data and 
the sampling scheme. Section 4 explains the empirical methodology. Section 5 presents 
the estimation results. Section 6 contains our conclusions.  5 
 
2.  Theoretical  background 
The exchange rate literature has been confronted with three challenging findings. 
First, since the seminal work by Messe and Rogoff (1983), it has been generally accepted 
that all the standard macro models of exchange rate determination are empirically 
unsuccessful. Second, a substantial number of studies find that technical trading rules, 
including ex ante rules, can generate excess profits in spot exchange rates, suggesting the 
existence of asymmetric information across traders (LeBaron, 1999; Neeley and Weller, 
2001). Third, Evans and Lyons (2001) show that most short-run exchange rate volatility 
is related to order flow, which in turn is associated with investor heterogeneity. These 
findings have increased interest in the role of information in the microstructure of foreign 
exchange markets, and it seems useful to view recent work on interventions within this 
framework.  
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argue that if information is costly, then market 
participants either will not have full information or will not completely understand its 
implications, and market exchange rates cannot continuously reflect all available 
information about their future distributions. Exchange rates will reflect information up to 
the point where the marginal benefit from acquiring and trading information equals the 
marginal cost. 
In an extreme case of imperfect information, when a substantial portion of market 
participants base trades on extrapolations of past exchange-rate movements, exchange 
rates might remain misaligned from their fundamental values, even when the more 
informed traders feel that the current exchange rates are inappropriate. The chartists and 
fundamentalists model originally proposed by Frankel and Froot (1986) has been 
frequently utilized both theoretically and empirically. De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005) 
show that this model is capable of reproducing the empirical puzzles of exchange rates 
such as the disconnect puzzle, excess volatility, fat tails and volatility clustering. Survey 
evidence also suggests that technical trading is widely used as a guide to short-term 
exchange rate behavior when traders form their expectations (Taylor and Allen, 1992; 
Cheung and Chinn, 2001). 
The recent exchange rate microstructure model developed by Baccheta and van 
Wincoop (2003) introduces trader heterogeneity, based on differences in the possession   6 
 
of information or the interpretation of information, into an otherwise standard monetary 
model of exchange rate determination. They demonstrate that information dispersion 
leads to magnification and endogenous persistence of the impact of non-fundamental 
trades on exchange rates.   
In such a market characterized by information asymmetries, a monetary authority 
with an information advantage regarding prospective market fundamentals could 
influence exchange rates if the authority conveys private information to the market 
through its intervention. A monetary authority typically maintains ongoing relationships 
with a select group of major banks (domestic and foreign) and uses these banks as 
counterparties for their foreign exchange transactions. In exchange for exclusivity, these 
dealers inform the monetary authorities about the conditions of foreign exchange markets, 
perceived reasons for market movements and the dealer’s customer order flows. These 
operations indicate that the monetary authorities gather information from a group of 
dealers and use it in making intervention decisions.
2 
Interventions are especially effective if they can coordinate traders with 
asymmetric information and push the current market rate towards its fundamental value. 
Popper and Montgomery (2001) emphasize the information sharing role of interventions. 
Since uninformed foreign exchange dealers can benefit from the monetary authority’s 
information on future fundamentals, intervention can influence exchange rates by 
transmitting such information and reducing information asymmetries among market 
participants. 
The above argument provides some testable implications. Firstly, interventions 
are more effective when market participants have heterogeneous information and the 
information asymmetry has pulled the exchange rate away from its fundamental value. 
Secondly, to effectively transmit credible information to the market, interventions should 
be unambiguous and easy to understand for the market. 
Given that interventions operate through a signaling channel, it would seem that 
monetary authorities would declare their intentions and actions with as much publicity as 
possible. Yet, there are many recorded instances in which interventions are undertaken 
                                                      
2  Bhattacharya and Weller (1997) and Vitale (1999) present theoretical models in which central banks 
maintain an information advantage and disseminate it to the market.   7 
 
under the cloak of secrecy. While there are some compelling reasons for the secrecy of 
interventions, research has not yet reached a consensus on the importance of secrecy 
(Dominguez and Frankel, 1993; Hung, 1997; Bhattacharya and Weller, 1997; Vitale, 
1999; Chiu, 2003).   
Thus, we test the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1 (Signaling hypothesis) 
Officially announced interventions have larger effects on exchange rate than 
unannounced interventions. 
Hypothesis 2 (Heterogeneity hypothesis) 
The signaling effect is more significant when traders have heterogeneous 
expectations of exchange rates. 
 
3.  Data 
3.1. Japanese interventions classified by newswire reports 
We classify interventions into three categories using news reports provided by 
Bloomberg and Reuters. ‘Announced interventions’ are those accompanied by official 
statements from government officials on the intervention day. The government officials 
may include the Minister of Finance, the Vice Minister of Finance for International 
Affairs, the Director General of the International Bureau and the Governor of the BOJ. 
They often confirm interventions by publicly stating that the BOJ intervened in the 
market.
 Then the statements are broadcast within few minutes by newswires along with 
the name of the official making the announcement. ‘Unannounced but reported 
interventions’ are reported by newswires but without any corresponding official 
statements. Newswire reports sometimes quote traders as saying, “[s]ome traders said 
that the BOJ intervened in the market at around 115 yen during the morning session” or 
“[t]he BOJ apparently bought dollars against yen.” ‘Secret interventions’ are not reported 
by the newswires, but do actually take place. 
Figure 1 displays monthly time-series evidence on the yen/dollar exchange rate 
and the size of Japanese interventions from May 13, 1991 to May 27, 2004. There are 
neither interventions for dollar sales above the rate of 125 yen/dollars nor dollar 
purchases below 125 yen/dollar.   8 
 
The classification of interventions is shown in Figure 2. During the sample period, 
there are 343 intervention days for the yen/dollar rate (10.1% of the sample). Among the 
intervention days, 208 (60.6%) are correctly reported by newswires, while 135 (39.6%) 
are not reported but have actually taken place (secret interventions). 12.8% of the 
intervention days are announced by government officials (announced interventions) and 
47.8% are not announced but are reported by newswires (unannounced interventions). 
The disclosed intervention data indicates the daily size of interventions. Table 1 
shows the relationships between intervention policy and intervention volume. The 
number of days for large-sized interventions (more than 500 billion yen a day) is 38 
(11.1%). The breakdown is 14 days of announced interventions, 16 days of unannounced 
but reported interventions and eight days of secret interventions. On the other hand, the 
number of small-sized intervention days (less than 50 billion yen per day) is 133 (36.5%). 
They have six days of announced interventions, 73 days of unannounced but reported 
interventions and 54 days of secret interventions. In general, the share of announced 
interventions increases with their size. 
 
3.2. Changes in intervention policy 
The Japanese intervention policy changed in June 1995 when Eisuke Sakakibara 
took over as Director General of the International Finance Bureau. He made a deliberate 
decision to reduce the frequency and increase the size of interventions (Sakakibara, 2002). 
Accordingly, some studies on Japanese interventions divide their sample period into pre 
and post June 1995 (Ito, 2003). The intervention policy also changed after his resignation, 
especially in terms of making official announcements about interventions. Hence, we 
divide our sample period into four sub-periods according to who is the Vice Minister of 
Finance for International Affairs of the MOF at the time, as he has the most influence on 
Japanese intervention decisions.
3 The sub-sample periods are period 1 (6/15/1992 - 
6/20/1995), period 2 (6/21/1995 - 7/7/1999), period 3 (7/8/1999 - 1/13/2003) and period 4 
                                                      
3  The MOF determines the volume and timing of interventions and the BOJ, which receives the order 
from the MOF, executes the intervention in the foreign exchange market. The decision makers for 
intervention are limited to the Minister of Finance, the Vice Minister and Deputy Vice Minister of 
Finance for International Affairs, the Director General of the International Bureau and the Director of 
the foreign Exchange Market Division. (Sakakibara, 2002)     9 
 
(1/14/2003 - 5/27/2004). Intervention techniques are quite different depending on the 
person who actually decides on the intervention. 
Table 2 shows the average size and intervention types for the 4 sub-periods. 
Period 1 is characterized by frequent, small interventions. In this period, frequency is the 
highest among 4 sub-periods (averaging an intervention every 4.77 days) and the average 
size of an intervention was 47 billion yen, which is the smallest among four sub-periods. 
There are 18 days of coordinated interventions with the Federal Reserve Bank of NY in 
period 1. During period 1, only 6.1% of interventions are announced, while more than 
70% are unannounced but reported interventions.   
In period 2, when Dr. Sakakibara was in charge of interventions, he reduced the 
intervention frequency (averaging 39.83 days between interventions), while increasing 
the average size of interventions (510 billion yen per day). The ratio of both ‘officially 
announced’ and ‘unannounced but reported’ interventions was high (91.6%). In addition, 
half of the announced interventions in period 2 were accompanied by Federal Reserve 
Bank of NY interventions.   
In period 3 the trend of infrequent but large interventions continued. There were 
only 25 intervention days (averaging 36.72 days per intervention) and the average size of 
an intervention was approximately 530 billion yen, which is the largest among the four 
sub-periods. It is remarkable that all of the interventions in period 3 were announced. 
In period 4 the intervention policy changed dramatically, from being infrequent 
and large to frequent and medium-sized. The frequency of interventions in period 4 
increased to an average of an intervention every 2.78 business days. Another big change 
was the very high ratio of secret interventions, which made up 74.4% of all interventions 
in this period. After Mr. Mizoguchi was appointed as Vice Minister of Finance for 
International Affairs, government officials declined to make comments or give any 
interviews. Instead of announcing interventions as they occurred, the MOF started to 
reveal the monthly volume of interventions at the end of each month and the size of the 
interventions every three months. In response to the change in the intervention strategy, 
newswire reports turned to vague statements such as “market participants are keeping 
watch for a possible intervention” and “[t]he BOJ seemed to be active in the market.”  10 
 
4.  Empirical  methodology 
The usually considered primary objectives of exchange rate interventions are 
directing trends in exchange rate movements and calming disorderly markets.
4 These 
motivations suggest that central banks aim to influence not only exchange rate values, but 
also exchange rate volatility. There are broadly two types of exchange rate volatility that 
one might address with interventions: GARCH volatility and expected volatility as 
implied by option prices on exchange rate futures. We choose the latter because the effect 
of interventions on market expectations seems more compatible with the signaling 
hypothesis.
5 Furthermore, the use of a GARCH model to estimate the effect of 
interventions on exchange rate volatility has been recently questioned. Since shocks to 
exchange rate volatility are highly persistent (“volatility clustering”), incorporating 
intervention variables into the GARCH specification is equivalent to assuming that the 
effects of interventions are also persistent. If the effects are transitory, this framework is 
not valid (Watanabe and Harada, 2005). In addition, having only a small number of 
classified interventions makes it difficult to estimate the volatility equation of the 
GARCH model especially when we include the interaction term between the intervention 
dummy and the expectation heterogeneity variable. 
To analyze the effect of interventions on exchange rates, we assume that the daily 
rate of return of the yen/dollar exchange rate without interventions is built around the 
standard Martingale model with time dependent conditional heteroskedasticity. 
Following Bollerslev (1986) and Baillie and Bollerslev (1989), the conditional variance is 
modeled as a linear GARCH (1,1) process and the conditional density is Gaussian. We 
would judge that an intervention is effective in controlling the exchange rate if it 
significantly affects daily returns in the appropriate direction. 
                                                      
4  The other reasons for interventions include rebalancing central banks’ reserve holdings and 
supporting fellow central banks in their exchange rate operations. Of the four listed reasons, only 
portfolio rebalancing does not involve a desired change in the level or volatility of exchange rates. 
Since monetary authorities rarely provide traders with information regarding their specific goals for 
particular intervention operations, we assume that relatively few interventions take place for the sole 
purpose of portfolio rebalancing. 
5  Another drawback of using implied volatility computed from currency option prices is that the 
results may be sensitive to assumptions about risk neutrality.   11 
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where  ) / ln( 100 1 − = t t t S S r  is the logarithmic return of the spot exchange rate (expressed 
as a percentage) with  t S  the being yen/dollar rate (NY close).
6  t X  denotes a vector of 
independent variables related to the Japanese and the U.S. interventions as well as macro 
variables which may affect exchange rates. 
Following Bonser-Neal and Tanner (1996) and Dominguez (1998), the volatility 
equation is specified as follows: 
t t t t Z b Y a iv ε + + = −1
' '                                                     (2) 
where  ) / ln( 100 1 − = t t t IV IV iv  is the logarithmic return of the implied volatility 
(expressed as a percentage) with  t IV  the implied volatility estimate derived from 
at-the-money option prices (one- and three-month) on the spot yen/dollar rates from the 
Tokyo market (5 PM). Because market participants cannot know the Fed’s intervention 
(with certainty) at 5 PM (Tokyo time) on the same day, the variables related to the Fed’s 
intervention are lagged by one day. These form  t Z . The variables concerning the 
Japanese interventions and macro variables are included in  t Y . It should be noted that all 
variables in the volatility equation are taken to be the absolute values of those in the level 
equation. 
Existing empirical research testing the signaling hypothesis using news reports 
typically splits interventions into reported interventions and secret interventions and 
analyzes the significance of the coefficients for the volume of each type of intervention 
(Dominguez, 1998; Beine, Benassy-Quere and Lecourt, 2002). The alternative way of 
                                                      
6  As explained by Ito (2003), the disclosed Japanese intervention volume is the result of interventions 
in the Tokyo, Europe, and U.S. markets, either carried out directly by the BOJ or by other central 
banks on behalf of the BOJ. Given the disclosure constraint of daily aggregation, the best proxy for 
exchange rate changes due to interventions on a particular day can be measured by the change in the 
NY closing rate across consecutive days. 
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analyzing the difference in the effectiveness of intervention strategies is to use intercept 
dummies representing intervention strategies as independent variables independent of 
intervention volume. 
Although market traders do not know the exact intervention volumes on 
intervention days, they can guess the approximate sizes based on market rumors and 
trading activity, especially when large-scale interventions are carried out. As intervention 
volume increases, these can function as signals from central banks to the market. This 
contradicts the view of shifting slopes because the difference between announced and 
unannounced interventions lessens as intervention volume increases. Although using 
intercept dummies seems preferable to shifting slopes, we would leave the choice of 
model specification to empirical tests. Accordingly, we estimate the model incorporating 
both slope and intercept dummies and test which specification is more appropriate.   
Three dummies are considered in the estimation equations for announced 
interventions, unannounced but reported interventions and secret interventions for Japan 
and the U.S. (There were no secret interventions by the U.S.) Dummies take a value of +1 
if such an intervention strategy is carried out for dollar purchases (yen sales), -1 for yen 
purchases (dollar sales) and zero otherwise. The intervention volume variable is also 
signed with + (dollar purchases) and – (yen purchases). If dollar purchase interventions 
by the U.S. and Japanese monetary authorities tend to cause the dollar to appreciate and 
the yen to depreciate, the coefficients would be expected to be positive. 
When shifting slopes, one multiplies the intervention dummies and volumes with 
signs in accordance to purchases and sales of foreign currencies and use these as the 
independent variables. As suggested by Dominguez (1998), we also include the interest 
rate differential between the Japanese and U.S. overnight money market rates in the level 
equation in order to account for relative contemporaneous monetary policies in both 
countries.
7 
For the volatility equation, a holiday dummy is included which takes a value of 1 
if the previous day is a holiday and 0 otherwise, following Dominguez (1998). Since 
variables related to interventions are all taken as absolute values, we would expect 
                                                      
7  The overnight market rates are the Federal Funds rate for the U.S. and the call rate for Japan.   13 
 
negative signs for the coefficients if interventions were effective in reducing expected 
volatility. 
The problem of simultaneity has been frequently raised in the empirical research 
on interventions. If official intervention and exchange rate changes are simultaneously 
determined, interventions are not exogenous to current market conditions and may yield 
inconsistent and biased estimates. However, Goodhart and Hesse (1989) and 
Almekinders (1995) suggest that it takes at least two days for central banks to begin 
intervening in the foreign exchange market in response to excessively volatile spot 
exchange rates and deviations from target levels because of institutional features of 
monetary authority decision making processes. We assume that interventions are 
exogenous to spot exchange rate behavior on intervention days. 
 
5.  Estimation  results 
5.1.  Is  signaling  effective? 
The first hypothesis to test is the signaling hypothesis. Specifically, we examine 
whether officially announced interventions have a larger effect on exchange rates than 
secret interventions. 
Table 3 presents the results of the estimations on the full sample period, one of 
which incorporates intercept dummies and differentiated slopes for announced, 
unannounced but reported, and secret interventions by the U.S. and Japanese monetary 
authorities. The Wald tests below show that the coefficients of slopes for the classified 
interventions are not significantly different from each other, while the intercept dummies 
are significantly different. This suggests that the intercept dummy model is preferable, as 
suggested in the previous section. 
On the right hand side of the estimation results for the full sample period, the 
coefficient of the Japanese announced interventions dummy is significantly positive, 
while the coefficients of the Japanese unannounced but reported interventions dummy 
and the secret interventions dummy are significantly negative. The negative sign on the 
coefficient of unannounced interventions does not necessarily imply that interventions 
without official announcements cannot influence exchange rates. Taking into account the   14 
 
volume effect, such strategies can be effective although their efficacy is significantly less 
than that of announced interventions. 
During the sample period, whenever the U.S. authorities intervened, the Japanese 
authorities intervened on the same day. There were no unilateral U.S. interventions, while 
there were many by the Japanese authorities. Hence, the U.S. intervention dummy 
captures the impact of coordinated interventions between the U.S. and Japan. On the 
other hand, the Japanese intervention dummies represent the Japanese unilateral 
intervention effect because we take into account the effect of coordinated interventions. 
Both announced and unannounced but reported U.S. interventions are 
significantly effective, conditional on the volume of the intervention. On the other hand, 
the intervention volume does not affect exchange rates if we control for the intervention 
dummies. For the U.S. monetary authorities, it is whether the intervention is announced 
and/or reported that has a significant influence on exchange rates, not the size of the 
intervention. 
The regression results for 4 sub-sample periods are presented in Table 4. The 
interesting result is that the coefficient of the dummy for secret interventions is 
significant and negative in period 1, while that of the dummy for announcement is 
significantly positive in period 2. This sharp contrast suggests that Dr. Sakakibara’s 
policy change in favor of official announcements might lead to more successful 
interventions. The evidence that the signaling effect is effective only in period 2 and not 
in other sub-sample periods is consistent with previous studies showing that signaling 
effects have ambiguous empirical support. 
The main result from Table 4 is that announcement effects are significant only in 
period 2. Official announcements alone do not necessarily guarantee the success of an 
intervention. A natural question arises: why did Dr. Sakakibara’s announcements succeed 
in period 2? 
 
5.2.    Does expectation heterogeneity matter for the efficacy of announcements? 
The next hypothesis to test is the heterogeneity hypothesis. We examine whether 
the announcement of interventions has a stronger influence when traders have 
heterogeneous expectations of exchange rates. In order to test this hypothesis, one   15 
 
includes the interaction term between the announced intervention dummy and a variable 
representing the expectation heterogeneity of future exchange rates among traders. 
However, survey data on exchange rate forecasts are not available on a daily basis. Thus 
we need to find a proxy for the dispersion of exchange rate expectations across traders. 
Recent research on market microstructure presents theories for explaining 
volatility and trading volume in connection with the concentration of information in the 
market (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988). Using survey data on exchange rate forecasts, 
there is an increasing amount of evidence supporting these theories. They find that 
expectation heterogeneity leads to an increase in trading volume and exchange rate 
volatility, while volatility increases expectation heterogeneity (Chionis and MacDonald, 
1997; Frankel and Froot, 1990). Following these studies, we use implied volatility and 
trading volume to test whether they are good proxies for expectation heterogeneity 
among traders. 
To measure traders’ expectation heterogeneity, we use survey data collected by 
the Japan Center for International Finance (JCIF) in Tokyo, Japan.
8  Since May 1985, the 
JCIF has been conducting telephone surveys twice a month, on the second and last 
Wednesdays. Point forecasts of the yen/dollar exchange rate for the one-, three- and 
six-month horizons are obtained from foreign exchange experts in forty-four companies.
9 
The JCIF calculates the average, the standard deviation, the maximum and the minimum 
for the responses. Of these, we use the standard deviation and the coefficient of variation 
(the standard deviation divided by the sample mean forecasts). 
We use the trading volume of all active brokered interdealer yen/dollar spot 
exchange trades on the Tokyo foreign exchange market, as collected by the Nikkei. This 
is the only available source of daily spot currency market trading volume data over our 
sample period. Daily trading volume has a moderate upward-trend over the sample period. 
In addition, the share of brokered interdealer trades may have increased since an 
electronic broking system was introduced in 1993, although there is no discontinuity in 
the data around the time of its introduction. To address these issues, we create the 
                                                      
8  For the details of the data, see Ito (1990). 
9  These companies are 15 banks and brokers, four securities companies, six trading companies, nine 
export-oriented companies, five life insurance companies and five import-oriented companies.   16 
 
following volume variable, following Chaboud and LeBaron (1999). The variable is the 
ratio of today’s trading volume to a sum of the previous 30, 50 and 100 trading volumes. 
Trading volume variablet = volt volt−s s=1
i ∑ , i = 30,50,100 
The exchange rate forecast survey data is provided on a bimonthly basis, while 
implied volatility and trading volume data are provided on a daily basis. We then collect 
bimonthly data for implied volatility and trading volumes corresponding to exchange rate 
forecasts. The correlation coefficients are presented in Table 7. The standard deviation of 
forecasts is highly correlated with implied volatility (0.6～0.7), while the correlation 
between the heterogeneity of expectations and the trading volume variable is low (0.1～
0.2). This result is robust if we use the standard deviation of heterogeneity measures 
divided by the sample mean (the coefficient of variation). Therefore, we make use of 
implied volatility as a proxy for the heterogeneity of exchange rate expectations among 
traders. 
Tables 6 and 7 report the results of whether the effects of official interventions on 
the level and the volatility of exchange rates depend on expectation heterogeneity. The 
independent variables include the interaction terms between the intervention dummies 
and implied volatility (one- and three-month). To prevent a simultaneity problem, the 
interaction terms consist of the one period lagged values of implied volatility. Since 
implied volatility is highly persistent, the one period lag is a proxy for the implied 
volatility just before an intervention. 
In the first column of Table 6 (results for the whole sample period), the result of 
the estimation with one-month implied volatility is displayed. The coefficient of the 
interaction term between the Japanese announcement dummy and the lagged implied 
volatility is positive and significant, while that of the Japanese announced dummy is 
significantly negative. This suggests that the announcement effects have a non-linear 
relationship with exchange rate changes, which depends on implied volatility. Based on 
these coefficients, we can state that official announcements influence exchange rates if 
the lagged implied volatility is greater than 11.347%. Furthermore, the significantly 
positive coefficient of the interaction term between the Japanese intervention volume and 
the lagged implied volatility shows that large-scale interventions are effective when the   17 
 
lagged implied volatility is sufficiently high (more than 11%). By contrast, keeping 
interventions secret (both the unannounced but reported interventions and the secret 
interventions) has no significant impact on the exchange rates themselves. The results in 
the period 2 shows that lagged implied volatility of more than 10.187% is required for 
announced interventions to be effective. When implied volatility on the last trading day is 
sufficiently high, the effect of official announcements on exchange rate is significant. 
This result is robust even when we use the three-month implied volatility presented at the 
bottom of Table 6. 
Table 7 shows the effect of interventions on the volatility of exchange rates. Like 
Table 6, there is a non-linear relationship between interventions and official 
announcements which depends on the implied volatility. The result for the whole sample 
period suggests that when the lagged implied volatility is more than 13.986%, official 
announcements can reduce volatility because the interaction term has a negative 
coefficient. However, the coefficient of the interaction term between intervention volume 
and the lagged implied volatility is significantly positive, mitigating the effect on 
volatility. We then consider both volume effect and announcement effect simultaneously. 
For example, suppose the intervention volume is 200 billion yen (the average for the 
whole sample period). We find that a lagged implied volatility of more than 15.119% is 
needed for an announced intervention to reduce the volatility of exchange rates. This 
indicates that lagged implied volatility, serving as a proxy for expectation heterogeneity, 
is an important factor in the efficacy of interventions on both the level and volatility of 
exchange rates. 
 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the central bank intervention literature by showing that 
the effectiveness of official interventions in the foreign exchange market depends not 
only on the firmness of signals but also on the heterogeneity of expectations across agents. 
Consistent with previous studies, intervention announcements do not always affect 
exchange rates. Once expectation heterogeneity is considered, however, the effectiveness 
of announcing interventions improves significantly. These findings are explained by   18 
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Table 1.　Intervention policy and volume (5/13/1991-5/27/2004)
Intervention volume







1～499 133 6 73 54
100.0% 4.5% 54.9% 40.6%
500～999 64 4 40 20
100.0% 6.2% 62.5% 31.3%
1000～1999 48 7 14 27
100.0% 14.6% 29.2% 56.2%
2000～4999 60 13 21 26
100.0% 21.7% 35.0% 43.3%
5000～26201 38 14 16 8
100.0% 36.8% 42.1% 21.1%
Total 343 44 164 135
100.0% 12.8% 47.8% 39.4%




Table 2.　Intervention policy in Japan and the US













＜Full sample period ： 3119days＞
5/13/1991-5/27/2004 343 44 164 135 22 11 11 0
12.8% 47.8% 39.4% 50.0% 50.0% 0.0%
Average volume of interventions per day
(JPY 100 million/USD 1million) 1991 4225 1735 1573 358 398 318 0
＜Period 1 ： 787days＞
5/13/1991-6/20/1995 165 10 118 37 18 7 11 0
6.1% 71.5% 22.4% 38.9% 61.1% 0.0%
Average volume of interventions per day
(JPY 100 million/USD 1million) 470 642 514 281 328 344 318 0
＜Period 2 ： 956days＞
6/21/1995-7/7/1999 24 8 14 2 4 4 0 0
33.3% 58.3% 8.3% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Average volume of interventions per day
(JPY 100 million/USD 1million) 5105 4598 6025 683 492 492 0 0
＜Period 3 ： 918days＞
7/8/1999-1/13/2003 25 25 0 0 0 0 0 0
100.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Average volume of interventions per day
(JPY 100 million/USD 1million) 5282 5282 0 0 0 0 0 0
＜Period 4 ： 358days＞
1/14/2003-5/27/2004 129 1 32 96 0 0 0 0
0.8% 24.8% 74.4%
Average volume of interventions per day
(JPY 100 million/USD 1million) 2719 10667 4359 2090 0 0 0 0
Note. The US interventions during the sample period were all coordinated with the Japan.
Period
JP Interventions





Table 3.　Signaling effects of interventions (full sample period)
＜Independent variables＞ Estimates Estimates
Constant　 -0.02841 * (0.01686) -0.02908 * (0.01681)
Interest rate differential -0.01029 ** (0.00444) -0.01023 ** (0.00441)
(a) JP announced intervention dummy 0.20622 * (0.11830) 0.16964 * (0.10284)
(b) JP unannounced but reported intervention
dummy -0.27716 *** (0.05577) -0.23575 *** (0.05291)
(c) JP secret intervention dummy -0.08170 (0.07398) -0.16268 *** (0.06227)
(d) US announced intervention dummy 0.27741 (0.32715) 0.88021 *** (0.23395)
(e) US unannounced but reported intervention
dummy 1.21369 *** (0.16220) 0.82522 *** (0.12386)
JP intervention volume 0.00006 *** (0.00001)
US intervention volume 0.00028 (0.00036)
(f) JP intervention volume * JP announced
intervention dummy 0.00006 ** (0.00003)
(g) JP intervention volume * JP unannounced
but reported intervention dummy 0.00008 *** (0.00001)
(h) JP intervention volume * JP secret
intervention dummy 0.00002 (0.00003)
(i) US intervention volume * US announced
intervention dummy 0.00186 *** (0.00052)
(j) US intervention volume * US unannounced
but reported intervention dummy -0.00079 (0.00051)
Constant 0.00847 *** (0.00125) 0.00847 *** (0.00124)
ARCH(1) 0.04183 *** (0.00339) 0.04225 *** (0.00340)
GARCH(1) 0.94122 *** (0.00504) 0.94093 *** (0.00498)
Obs.
Wald tests on the coefficients
Statistic P-value
JP intervention dummies H0: (a)=(b)=(c)  11.88 *** 0.0026
US intervention dummies H0: (d)=(e)  6.72 *** 0.0095
JP dummies with volume H0: (f)=(g)=(h)  3.49 0.1742
US dummies with volume H0: (i)=(j)  13.79 *** 0.0002







          % change in exchange rate＞
Mean Equation
＜Dependet variable： Full sample period




Table 4.　Signaling effects of interventions (4 sub-periods)
＜Independent variables＞
Constant -0.02287 (0.02088) -0.08063 (0.31185) -0.03560 (0.05211) -0.35502 (0.25780)
Interest rate differential -0.00464 (0.01149) -0.02597 (0.06303) -0.00702 (0.01146) -0.29332 (0.23486)
JP intervention volume -0.00034 *** (0.00010) 0.00008 ** (0.00004) 0.00007 ** (0.00003) 0.00005 *** (0.00002)
US intervention volume -0.00051 (0.00052) 0.00363 (0.00341)
JP announced intervention dummy 0.71887 (2.20465) 0.98002 *** (0.22459) 0.00146 (0.21008) 0.13401 (1410422.0)
JP unannounced but reported intervention dummy -0.13588 * (0.07932) -0.21027 (0.24231) -0.07833 (0.12260)
JP secret intervention dummy -0.04024 (0.12817) 0.61182 (0.96955) -0.12982 * (0.07849)
US announced intervention dummy -0.19043 (2.24582) 0.24045 (1.24923)
US unannounced but reported intervention dummy 1.21644 *** (0.16579)
Constant 0.01458 *** (0.00314) 0.00867 *** (0.00269) 0.78552 *** (0.03472) 0.06685 ** (0.02742)
ARCH(1) 0.04485 *** (0.00625) 0.06651 *** (0.00846) 0.01408 (0.00895) 0.14402 *** (0.04131)
GARCH(1) 0.92437 *** (0.00998) 0.92195 *** (0.01052) 0.92162 *** (0.06338) 0.63744 *** (0.11435)
Obs.
2. There were no US interventions in Period 3 and 4.
3. The scales are 100 million yen for JP interventions and million dollars for US interventions.
1. Standard errors are in parenthesis.　*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Log likelihood -1062.058 -1161.028 -890.183 -283.995
1072 1056 918 358
5/13/1991-6/20/1995




          % change in exchange rate＞
Method：GARCH-ML











Table 5. Correlation Coefficients
S.d. of forecasts (1M) 0.6687 *** 0.1552 *** 0.1607 *** 0.1712 ***
S.d. of forecasts (3M) 0.5813 *** 0.1545 ** 0.1202 ** 0.1418 **
Coefficient of variation (1M) 0.7045 *** 0.2040 *** 0.1694 *** 0.1604 ***
Coefficient of variation (3M) 0.6434 *** 0.1844 *** 0.1350 ** 0.1358 **
1. The s.d. of forecasts is the standard deviation of foreign exchange forecasts and the coefficient of variation is the
standard deviation devided by the sample mean of forecasts.














2. The trading volume variables are the % ratios of spot trading volumes on intervention days in the Tokyo market to the
sum of trading volume from 30, 50, and 100 days prior to the intervention day to 1day, respectively.









Table 6.　Impact on the level of exchange rates
＜Dependent variable：　% change in exchange rate＞
＜Independent variables＞
Constant -0.02631 (0.04994) -0.25873 ** (0.12318) -0.11425 (0.30864) -0.04228 (0.10372) -0.29945 (0.36541)
Interest rate differential -0.00967 ** (0.00490) 0.00216 (0.01218) -0.04234 (0.06250) -0.00556 (0.01329) -0.30890 (0.23609)
JP intervention volume -0.00003 (0.00005) 0.00021 (0.00060) -0.00025 (0.00034) -0.00034 (0.00031) -0.00007 (0.00023)
US intervention volume -0.00011 (0.00036) -0.00074 (0.00051) -0.00082 (0.00476)
JP announced intervention dummy -1.57181 *** (0.50811) -2.97095 (1.92571) -4.61717 (3.18750) 1.95604 (1.99689)
JP unannounced but reported intervention dummy -0.08796 (0.20888) -0.14556 (0.36894) -0.38956 (2.20585) 0.66116 (1.01010)
JP secret intervention dummy -0.00271 (0.36922) 0.10749 (0.68229) -8.52430 (1498.27) 0.35933 (0.70338)
US intervention dummy 0.95277 *** (0.13555) 1.14824 *** (0.16245) 2.05673 (1.83969)
IV1M(-1) 0.00003 (0.00503) 0.02493 * (0.01277) -0.00374 (0.00639) 0.00115 (0.01039) -0.00791 (0.02601)
JP intervention volume＊IV1M(-1) 0.00001 ** (0.00000) -0.00005 (0.00004) 0.00003 (0.00003) 0.00003 (0.00002) 0.00001 (0.00002)
JP announced intervention dummy＊IV1M(-1) 0.13852 *** (0.03957) 0.21583 (0.13807) 0.45325 * (0.23692) -0.15397 (0.15457) -0.01403 (63804.6)
JP unannounced but reported intervention dummy＊IV1M(-1) -0.01397 (0.01860) -0.00108 (0.03034) 0.01095 (0.16304) -0.07934 (0.11188)
JP secret intervention dummy＊IV1M(-1) -0.01526 (0.03887) -0.01818 (0.06406) 0.67754 (107.399) -0.05289 (0.07559)
Constant 0.00852 *** (0.00127) 0.01498 *** (0.00322) 0.01041 *** (0.00310) 0.78111 *** (0.03530) 0.06853 ** (0.02890)
ARCH(1) 0.04241 *** (0.00351) 0.04620 *** (0.00696) 0.07447 *** (0.00981) 0.01603 * (0.00953) 0.13984 *** (0.04316)
GARCH(1) 0.94056 *** (0.00518) 0.92209 *** (0.01042) 0.91115 *** (0.01231) 0.91099 *** (0.06622) 0.63400 *** (0.12073)
Obs.
＜Independent variables＞
Constant -0.03923 (0.06079) -0.50221 *** (0.19141) -0.09809 (0.31079) -0.06723 (0.13341) -0.32266 (0.46624)
Interest rate differential -0.00894 * (0.00518) 0.01305 (0.01335) -0.04063 (0.06233) -0.00269 (0.01525) -0.31468 (0.23686)
JP intervention volume -0.00004 (0.00006) 0.00002 (0.00078) -0.00010 (0.00049) -0.00033 (0.00033) -0.00010 (0.00030)
US intervention volume -0.00018 (0.00036) -0.00069 (0.00048) -0.00013 (0.01522)
JP announced intervention dummy -2.33257 *** (0.59075) -3.79772 (3.17507) -7.21467 * (4.10557) 1.32081 (2.21997)
JP unannounced but reported intervention dummy 0.00580 (0.28845) 0.10305 (0.51123) -2.31101 (3.34916) 1.15995 (1.44807)
JP secret intervention dummy -0.01553 (0.42226) 0.42541 (0.97802) -7.15537 (423.179) 0.62308 (0.99393)
US intervention dummy 0.94631 *** (0.13360) 1.15783 *** (0.15861) 1.42588 (4.85990)
IV3M(-1) 0.00147 (0.00608) 0.04841 ** (0.01919) -0.00424 (0.00729) 0.00442 (0.01439) -0.00605 (0.04103)
JP intervention volume＊IV3M(-1) 0.00001 * (0.00001) -0.00003 (0.00006) 0.00001 (0.00004) 0.00003 (0.00003) 0.00002 (0.00003)
JP announced intervention dummy＊IV3M(-1) 0.20538 *** (0.04695) 0.28650 (0.24277) 0.64898 ** (0.30666) -0.10151 (0.17698) -0.00497 (6240.25)
JP unannounced but reported intervention dummy＊IV3M(-1) -0.02278 (0.02623) -0.02304 (0.04354) 0.16009 (0.25207) -0.13292 (0.16298)
JP secret intervention dummy＊IV3M(-1) -0.01360 (0.04433) -0.04840 (0.09143) 0.56456 (30.5099) -0.08156 (0.10739)
Constant 0.00861 *** (0.00127) 0.01508 *** (0.00327) 0.01045 *** (0.00310) 0.78313 *** (0.03374) 0.06891 ** (0.02938)
ARCH(1) 0.04288 *** (0.00349) 0.04601 *** (0.00669) 0.07433 *** (0.00979) 0.01470 * (0.00872) 0.13952 *** (0.04406)
GARCH(1) 0.93988 *** (0.00516) 0.92190 *** (0.01021) 0.91121 *** (0.01231) 0.92136 *** (0.06032) 0.63284 *** (0.12286)
Obs.
2. The implied volatilities are calculated from the 1month and 3month yen/dollar option prices (at the money).
3. There were no US interventions in Period 3 and 4.
4. Announced intervention dummy is dropped in Period 4 due to collinearity since Period 4 had only one announced intervention. 





1. Standard errors are in parenthesis.　*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.








Method：GARCH-ML  5/13/1991-5/27/2004 5/13/1991-6/20/1995 6/21/1995-7/7/1999








Table 7.　Impact on the implied volatility of exchange rates
＜Dependent variable：　% change in implied volatility (1Month) ＞
＜Independent variables＞
Constant 1.60325 *** (0.58613) 2.78583 *** (0.88959) 1.50555 (1.02865) 3.41512 *** (1.02003) 5.92218 (3.86109)
Holiday dummy 1.67066 *** (0.22027) 2.10783 *** (0.43275) 1.12039 *** (0.40584) 1.59795 *** (0.34845) 2.19670 *** (0.68378)
IV1M (-1) -0.19584 *** (0.05391) -0.35538 *** (0.08861) -0.15448 * (0.08414) -0.36101 *** (0.09580) -0.67275 (0.41184)
JP intervention volume -0.00123 ** (0.00053) 0.02015 ** (0.00809) -0.00107 (0.00236) 0.00184 (0.00202) -0.00067 (0.00147)
US intervention volume(-1) -0.00536 (0.00736) -0.00844 (0.00710) -0.02343 (0.02023)
JP announced intervention dummy 18.29030 *** (6.02462) 9.89727 (9.83324) 15.70027 (13.30194) -1.28443 (12.54632)
JP unannounced but reported intervention dummy 6.21695 ** (2.52241) -2.56888 (4.57857) 12.69043 (14.05274) -0.07677 (7.85854)
JP secret intervention dummy 1.80667 (2.13406) -1.76348 (3.98475) 19.76964 *** (2.57810) 4.10002 (5.91153)
US intervention dummy(-1) 7.71190 ** (3.85237) 5.92973 * (3.47585) 24.37526 * (13.17329)
JP intervention volume * IV1M(-1) 0.00013 *** (0.00005) -0.00127 ** (0.00059) 0.00011 (0.00018) -0.00006 (0.00016) 0.00008 (0.00015)
JP announced intervention dummy * IV1M(-1) -1.30776 *** (0.47959) -0.71599 (0.82659) -1.17238 (0.92174) 0.03450 (1.00898) 0.67676 ** (0.31147)
JP unannounced but reported intervention dummy * IV1M(-1) -0.43812 ** (0.21486) 0.21149 (0.36682) -0.82513 (1.11691) 0.02871 (0.79520)
JP secret intervention dummy * IV1M(-1) -0.21101 (0.21002) 0.11263 (0.33427) -1.19621 *** (0.20020) -0.53828 (0.63916)
Durbin-Watson d statistic
Obs.
＜Dependet variable：　% change in implied volatility (3Month) ＞
＜Independent variables＞
Constant 0.96651 ** (0.38843) 1.86833 *** (0.70690) 0.95245 (0.68698) 2.36562 *** (0.77683) 5.64470 * (3.26212)
Holiday dummy 0.59117 *** (0.13607) 0.97851 *** (0.23696) 0.38082 (0.26173) 0.43107 * (0.24474) 0.50561 (0.41553)
IV3M (-1) -0.10624 *** (0.03530) -0.21742 *** (0.07031) -0.08867 (0.05476) -0.22918 *** (0.07196) -0.61372 * (0.35298)
JP intervention volume -0.00079 ** (0.00037) 0.01297 * (0.00670) -0.00196 (0.00165) 0.00020 (0.00088) -0.00048 (0.00146)
US intervention volume(-1) -0.00335 (0.00360) -0.00493 (0.00318) -0.01578 (0.01446)
JP announced intervention dummy 8.97668 ** (4.37981) 7.30466 (7.79161) 20.54609 * (11.44985) -3.27220 (8.17312)
JP unannounced but reported intervention dummy 3.24442 * (1.75997) -2.37052 (3.43706) 15.04017 (9.86125) -1.21566 (7.59332)
JP secret intervention dummy 1.13428 (1.72996) -1.63846 (3.32618) 6.06547 *** (1.78249) 2.21941 (4.87820)
US intervention dummy(-1) 4.01334 ** (1.99582) 2.83572 * (1.51006) 15.16852 (9.86614)
JP intervention volume * IV3M(-1) 0.00008 ** (0.00003) -0.00089 * (0.00053) 0.00016 (0.00012) 0.00003 (0.00007) 0.00005 (0.00016)
JP announced intervention dummy * IV3M(-1) -0.62742 * (0.36728) -0.55516 (0.67645) -1.54815 * (0.81109) 0.31250 (0.64482) 0.54156 ** (0.23298)
JP unannounced but reported intervention dummy * IV3M(-1) -0.22380 (0.15581) 0.20840 (0.28880) -1.04263 (0.77519) 0.14566 (0.81607)
JP secret intervention dummy * IV3M(-1) -0.12460 (0.17642) 0.10060 (0.30367) -0.27575 ** (0.13578) -0.27723 (0.53089)
Durbin-Watson d statistic
Obs.
2. Holiday dummy takes 1 for the day one day after holidays and 0 for others.
3. There were no US interventions in Period 3 and 4.
4. The implied volatilities are calculated from the 1month and 3month yen/dollar option prices (at the money).
5. The scales are 100 million yen for JP interventions and million dollars for US interventions.





1. White(1980)'s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis.　*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
R-squared 0.0329 0.0541
2.0041 2.0415 1.9753
Period 2 Period 3
 5/13/1991-5/27/2004 5/13/1991-6/20/1995 6/21/1995-7/7/1999 7/8/1999-1/13/2003



















































































































































































































































































































































































208 No official statements
(6.1% /60.6% ) （unannounced but reported interventions）
164
343 (4.8% /47.8%)









Source: the Ministry of Finance of Japan, Bloomberg and Reuters.














































































































































































































































































of forecasts s.d. of forecasts (1M) s.d. of forecasts (3M)
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Implied volatility(1M) Implied volatility(3M)
 35 





































































































































































































































































100 days 50 days 30 days
 